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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of the Case

Claimant Elfego Marquez was injured on the job while working for an employer who was
always aware of his status as an undocumented worker. The Idaho Workers' Compensation Act
expressly applies to any "person ... whether lawfully or unlmvfully employed ... " LC. § 72204(2). I\1r. Marquez's employer and its surety have conceded that J'vir. Marquez is a covered
employee and accepted his claim under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act, notwithstanding
his status as an undocumented worker. As required by the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act,
Mr. Marquez's employer and its surety have paid his medical bills, total temporary disability,

and permanent partial impaim1ent.
Despite having paid these benefits, Mr. Marquez's employer and surety are refusing to
pay any permanent disability benefits because of his status as an undocumented worker. Mr.
Marquez's employer and surety have taken this position in contravention of the express language
of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act which provides permanent disability benefits to all
Idaho employees whether lawfully or unlawfully employed.
In its Order below, the Idaho Industrial Commission agreed that undocumented workers
are entitled to pursue permanent disability benefits under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act
without reference to immigration status. Mr. Marquez's employer and its surety have appealed
this Order.
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II.

Statement of the Facts
Mr. Marquez is a 47-year-old individual born and raised in Mexico. 1 Afier obtaining a

teaching degree and teaching elementary age students in Mexico, Mr. Marquez's income was a
paltry $300 per month. 2 This was not enough to support his wife and daughter. 3
In or about 2000, Mr. Marquez left Mexico for the United States to look for better employment.4 Mr. Marquez was undocumented and did not enter the United States legally. 5 Mr.
Marquez initially traveled to California, where he purchased a fake social security card and used
it to obtain a job washing dishes and perfonning busboy duties at a restaurant. 6 With his restaurant income, Mr. Marquez was able to have his wife and daughter join.him in the United States. 7
After working in California for approximately eight months, J\1r. Marquez moved to Emmett,
Idaho, where he and his family have now resided for approximately eighteen years. 8
After arriving in Idaho, Mr. Marquez obtained a job with Pierce Painting, Inc. 9 Mr.
Marquez told the owner of Pierce Painting, Rick Pierce, about his immigration status and about
his status as an undocumented worker. 10 Mr. Pierce was aware that Mr. Marquez did not have a
legal right to work in the United States and that the social security card used by Mr. Marquez

Tr. p. 41, 11. 12-24.
Tr. p. 42, 1. 13 top. 43, 1. 12; Tr. p. 44, 11. 3-10.
3 Tr. p. 46, 11. 10-16.
4 Id.
5 R. atpp. 18-19 (StipulationofFacts).
6 Tr. p. 46, 11. 17-23; Tr. p. 47, 11. 19-20; Tr. p. 48, 11. 5-10; Tr. p. 51, 11. 10-18.
7 Tr. p. 51, 1. 10 top. 52, 1. 22.
8 Id.; Tr. p. 68, 11. 5-11.
9 Tr. p. 53, 11. 11-17.
10
·
Tr. p. 50, 1. 22 top. 51,
1. 5.
1

2
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was fake. 11 Not long after beginning at Pierce Painting, Mr. Pierce received a garnishment notice
associated with the fake social security number used by Mr. Marquez. 12 Mr. Pierce instructed

Mr. Marquez to get a different fake social security number. 13 Mr. Marquez complied by purchasing a different fake social security card and giving it to Mr. Pierce. 14
On May 20, 2010, while working for Pierce Painting, Mr. Marquez was in the process of
preparing a house for painting. 15 His employer was in a hurry to have the house ready, but there
was a shortage ofladders. 16 Mr. Marquez was told to do the best he could. 17 In order to reach an
elevated area of the house, Mr. Marquez stacked two buckets on top of each other and was standing on these buckets working. 18 The buckets tipped, and he fell to the cement floor. 19 In the fall,
he injured the shoulder and wrist of his dominant right arm. 20

Mr. Marquez was treated by Dr. Hassinger. 21 Despite multiple surgeries on his right
shoulder. Mr. Marquez has very limited use of his dominant right arm.. 22 He is totally unable to
lift his right arm above his shoulder. 23 Use of his right arm often requires that he hold his right

Tr. p. 51, 11. 3-5.
Tr. p. 49, 1. 12 top. 50, 1. 14.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Tr. p. 56, 1. 9 top. 58, 1. 3.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Tr. p. 58, 11. 4-25; Tr. p. 59, 11. 1-4.
21 Tr. pp. 59-60. See also Hearing Exhibits 1-19 (medical records).
22 Tr. p. 60, 11. 23-25; Tr. p. 61, 11. 1-10. See also Hearing Exhibits 1-19 (medical records).
23 Tr. p. 62, 11. 4-13. See also Hearing Exhibits 1-19 (medical records).

11
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elbow against his side to stabilize the arm and allow some use of the lower arm. 24 He is unable to
perform the duties of his job with Pierce Painting. 25 His ability to write with his dominant hand
has been severely compromised. 26 He experiences constant pain in his shoulder. 27 This pain prevents him from sleeping more than four hours at night. 28 Standing with his arm at his side for
more than twenty minutes causes his pain to increase significantly. 29 Washing dishes or sweeping the floor for as little as a few minutes leaves him in pain. 30 Even walking is difficult as he
,

cannot swing his right arm to counterbalance his stride. 31 In addition to his shoulder pain and
limitations, Mr. Marquez continues to suffer from additional pain and weakness in his wrist,
hand, and forearm from the injuries to his lower arm. 32
It is Dr. Hassinger's opinion that Mr. Marquez's shoulder will not improve. 33 Dr. Hassinger rated Mr. Marquez's right shoulder impairment at 5% of the whole person and recommended
permanent restrictions to avoid overhead activity with the right arm. 34 Dr. Hassinger specifically
recommended that Mr. Marquez not return to his time-of-injury job. 35

Tr. p. 61, 11. 11-25. See also Hearing Exhibits 1-19 (medical records).
Tr. p. 64, 11. 5-10. See also Hearing Exhibits 1-19 (medical records).
26 Tr. p. 59, 11. 5-15. See also Hearing Exhibits 1-19 (medical records).
27 Tr. p. 62, 11. 9. See also Hearing Exhibits 1-19 (medical records).
28 Defendants' Hearing Exhibit 19 (Marquez Deposition at p. 34, 11. 1-4 and p. 36, 11. 8-22).
29 Defendants' Hearing Exhibit 19 (Marquez Deposition at p. 34, 11. 2-11 and p. 35, 11. 2-25).
30 Tr. p. 63, 11. 5-14.
31 Defendants' Hearing Exhibit 19 (Marquez Deposition at p. 36, 11. 8-22).
32 Tr. p. 60, 11. 2-22.
33 Defendants' Hearing Exhibit 19 (Marquez Deposition at p. 24, 11. 12-19).
34 Claimant's Hearing Exhibit 5 at pp. 000072-000073.
35 Id.

24

25
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In July 2010, Mr. Marquez was referred to the Industrial Commission Rehabilitation Division (IRCD) by the State Insurance Fund. IRCD consultant Ken Halcomb was assigned to the
case. 36 Mr. Holcomb interviewed Mr. Marquez about his education, past work history, and transferable skills. 37 \Vhen it became evident that Mr. Marquez would not be able to return to his
time-of-injury job, Mr. Halcomb assisted 11r. Marquez in identifying other potential employment
opportunities more consistent ,vith his restrictions and within his geographic area. 38 Eventually,
Mr. Halcomb closed the file without placing Mr. Marquez with another employer. 39 The labor

market survey prepared by Mr. Halcomb at the time of closure suggested that Mr. Marquez
would probably not be able to find employment that would replace his time-of-injury wage of
$12.00 per hour with benefits including insurance, since most of the jobs identified by Mr. Hal-

comb were paid in a range of only $7.00 per hour to $9.00 per hour. 40
At no time prior to closure of the file did Mr. Halcomb learn that Mr. Marquez was an
undocumented worker. 41 In later testimony, Mr. Halcomb acknowledged that there is a labor
market for undocumented workers in the Treasure Valley. 42

Tr. p. 22, 11. 15-16. See also Defendants' Hearing Exhibit 6.
Tr. p. 24, 11. 12-16. See also Defendants' Hearing Exhibit 6.
38 Tr. p 19, 11. 8-14. See also Defendants' Hearing Exhibit 6.
39 Defendants' Hearing Exhibit 6.
40 Tr. p. 33, 11. 8-13; Tr. p. 56, 11. 1-3.
41 Tr. p. 33, 11. 16-18.
42 Tr. p. 36, 1. 36 top. 37, 1. 24.

36

37
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III.

Course of Proceedings
On April 14, 2015, Mr. Marquez filed a Workers' Compensation Complaint. 43 On May 1,

2015, he filed an Amended Workers' Compensation Complaint. 44 On May 14, 2015, Pierce
Painting and the State Insurance Fund (collectively "Surety") filed an Answer to the Amended
Complaint. 45 In the Answer to the Amended Complaint, the Surety admitted the occurrence of
the accident, the existence of the employment relationship, and the fact that the parties were subject to the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act.
Following the filing of the Workers' Compensation Complaint, the Surety conceded that

Mr. Marquez was a covered employee subject to the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act and accepted the claim notwithstanding his status as an undocumented worker. Based on this concession, the Surety paid Mr. Marquez's medical bills pursuant to LC. § 72-432, his total temporary
disability pursuant to LC. § 72-408, and his permanent partial impairment pursuant to LC. § 72428. Despite having paid Mr. Marquez's medical bills, total temporary disability, and permanent
partial impainnent, notwithstanding his status as an undocumented worker, the.Surety refused to
pay any permanent disability benefits because of his status as an undocumented worker.
Following a hearing by a referee, the Idaho Industrial Commission issued

an

Order on

July 10, 2017, concluding that Mr. Marquez "is entitled to pursue a claim for pennanent disabil-

43R.pp.1-5.
44 R. pp. 6-10.
45 R. pp. 13-14.
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ity without reference to his immigration status."46 On July 28, 2017, the Surety filed a Motion to
Reconsider. 47 On August 28, 2017, the Idaho Industrial Commission entered an Order, denying
the Motion to Reconsider. 48
On August 29, 201 7, the Surety filed a Motion for Immediate Appeal, which was granted
on September 21, 2017, by the Idaho Industrial Commission. 49 On October 4, 2017, the Surety
filed a Notice of Expedited Appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 12.4. 50

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The singular issue presented on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court is as follows:
1.

Whether the Idal10 Industrial Commission correctly determined that Mr.
Marquez is entitled to pursue permanent disability benefits under the
Idaho Worker's Compensation Act without reference to his immigration
status.

R. pp. 21-50.
R. pp. 60-72.
48 R. pp. 73-79.
49 R. pp. 80-85.
so R. pp. 86-90.

46

47
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue presented on appeal concerns the construction of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. With respect to the interpretation of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act, this
Court has established the standard ofreview as follows:
A constming court's primary duty is to give effect to the legislative intent
and purpose underlying a statute. Moreover, the court must construe a statute as a
whole, and consider all sections of applicable statutes together to determine the
intent of the legislature. It is incumbent upon the court to give the statute an interpretation that will not deprive it of its potency. In construing a statute, not only
must we examine the literal wording of the statute, but we also must study the
statute in harmony with its objective. We also must take account of all other matters such as the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations and the policy behind the statute.·
More specifically, we must liberally construe the provisions of the workers' compensation law in favor of the employee, in order to serve the humane
purpose for which the law was promulgated. The purpose of the workers' compensation law is to provide sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their
families and dependents. LC. § 72-201.

Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333, 336-37, 870 P.2d 1292, 1295-96 (1994) (internal citations omitted).
"When reviewing a decision by the Industrial Commission, this Court exercises free review over the Commission's conclusions of law, but will not disturb the Commission's factual
findings if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence." Kelly v. Blue Ribbon Lin-

en Supply, Inc., 159 Idaho 324, 326-27, 360 P.3d 333, 335-36 (2015). See also I.C. § 72-732.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Idaho Workers' Compensation Act unambiguously provides coverage and
benefits to all Idaho employees without regard to immigration status.
The Idaho Industrial Commission's Order holding that 1v1r. Marquez is entitled to pursue

a claim for permanent disability without reference to his immigration status is in harmony with
the express language of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act (IWCA) which provides coverage
and benefits to all Idaho employees without regard to whether they are lawfully or unlawfully
employed.
IWCA's scope and definitional terms are drafted very broadly to include all employment
and all employees without regard to the lavrfulness of the employment. Idaho Code § 72-203
provides that the IWCA "shall apply to all public employment and to all private employment including fann labor contracting not expressly exempt by the provisions of section 72-212." (Emphasis added). Idaho Code § 72-102(12) defines "employee" as "any person who has entered

into the employment of, or who works under contract of service or apprenticeship with, an employer. It does not include any person engaged in any of the excepted employments enumerated
in section 72-212." (Emphasis added). The language of LC. §§ 72-102(12), 72-203, and 72-212
contain no exclusion or exemption based upon the lawfulness of employment.
Specifically, with respect to private employment, the IWCA declares that the lawfulness
of employment is irrelevant. Idaho Code § 72-204(2) provides: "The following shall constitute
employees in private employment and their employers subject to the provisions of this law ... (2)
A person, including a minor, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, in the service of an em-
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player under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied .... " (Emphasis added).
This unambiguous definition of "employee" for purposes of the IWCA clearly expresses the Idaho legislature's intent that IWCA coverage and benefits be available to all private employees
without regard to the lawfulness of their employment.
The Surety does not dispute that Mr. Marquez is covered by the IWCA and is entitled to

at least some of its benefits without regard to the lawfulness of his employment as an undocumented worker. In its Answer to the Amended Complaint, the Surety admitted that Mr. Marquez
was subject to the IWCA. 51 The Surety has further conceded that Mr. Marquez, as an undocumented worker, is covered by the IWCA and entitled to its benefits by paying his medical bills
under I.C. § 72-432, his total temporary disability under LC. § 72-408, and his permanent partial
impaim1ent under LC. § 72-428.
Although the Surety concedes that an undocumented worker is entitled to these particular
IWCA benefits, the Surety nevertheless argues on appeal that an undocumented worker like Mr:
Marquez is not entitled to permanent disability benefits under the IWCA. The Surety's argument
should be rejected, because it contravenes the express language of I\VCA granting permanent
disability benefits.
Idalio Code § 72-423 provides that "pennanent disability" occurs "when the actual or

presumed ability to engage in gainfitl activity is reduced or absent because of pem1anent impairment and no fundamental or marked change in the future can be reasonably expected." (Empha-

51

R. pp. 13-14.
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sis added). Idaho Code § 72-425 provides: "Evaluation (rating) or permanent disability' is an appraisal of the injured employee's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity
as it is affected by the medical factor of permanent impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factors as provided in section 72-430, Idaho Code." 52 (Emphasis added). "The central focus of [LC.
§ 72-425] is on the 'ability to engage in gainful activity."' Page v. }.l[cCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302,308, 179 P.3d 265,271 (2008) (quoting Smith v. Payette County, 105 Idaho 618,621,
671 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1983)).
With respect to permanent disability benefits, LC. §§ 72-423 and 72-425 broadly include
any reduction in an employee's ability to engage in gainful activity without any limitation on that
gainful activity with respect to the lawfulness of employment. Moreover, LC. §§ 72-423 and 72425 expressly apply to any Idaho "employee," which is defined by LC. § 72-204(2) as "any person ... whether lawfully or unlawfully employed." Therefore, LC. §§ 72-423 and 72-425 unambiguously apply to all injured employees without regard to the lawfulness of the employment.
From the language of LC. §§ 72-204(2), 72-423, and 72-425, it is apparent that the Idaho
legislature intended for permanent disability benefits under the IWCA to be available to Idaho
workers without regard to the lawfulness of employment. In other words, the Idaho legislature

52

Similarly, LC. § 72-102(11) of the IWCA defines "disability" for purposes of determining total or partial disability income benefits as "a decrease in wage-earning capacity due to injury or
occupational disease, as such capacity is affected by the medical factor of physical impairment,
and by pertinent nonmedical factors as provided in section 72-430(1), Idaho Code." (Emphasis
added). Just as LC. § 72-425 does not limit "gainful activity" to only lawful employment, LC. §
72-102(11) does not limit "wage-earning capacity" to only lawful employment.
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intended that undocumented workers receive all benefits available under the IWCA, including
permanent disability benefits provided for in LC. §§ 72-423 and 72-425.
Contrary to the Surety's argument on appeal, the language of LC. § 72-430(1) does not
exclude or exempt an employee from permanent disability benefits based upon the lawfulness of
the employment. Idaho Code§ 72-430(1) provides:
(1) Matters to be considered. In determining percentages of permanent disabilities, account shall be taken of the nature of the physical disablement, the disfigurement if of a kind likely to limit the employee in procuring or holding employment, the cumulative effect of multiple injuries, the occupation of the employee,
and his age at the time of accident causing the injury, or manifestation of the occupational disease, consideration being given to the diminished ability of the afflicted employee to compete in an open labor market within a reasonable geographical area considering all the personal and economic circumstances of the
employee, and other factors as the commission may deem relevant ....
Just like all other statutes contained within the IWCA, LC. § 72-430(1) is devoid of any language, express or implied, prohibiting an employee from receiving permanent disability benefits
based upon the lawfulness of employment.

In construing the consideration factors contained in LC. § 72-430(1), it must be remembered that these factors are considered for the singular purpose of determining under LC. § 72425 whether clain1ant's capacity for "gainful activity" has been reduced because of the claimant's injury. See Seese v. Ideal of Idaho, 110 Idaho 32, 34, 714 P.2d 1, 3 (1985) (The
test ... is ... whether the physical impairment ... has reduced the claimant's capacity for gainful employment."). Under LC. § 72-425, only "pertinent" factors in LC. § 72-430(1) are considered.
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The factors in LC. § 72-430(1) are "pe1iinent" only if they are relevant to the claimant's capacity
for "gainful activity" under LC. § 72-425.
The first group of factors under LC. § 72-430(1) when determining an employee's capacity for "gainful activity" under LC. § 72-425, include (a) the nature of the physical disablement, (b) disfigurement likely to limit the employee's ability to procure or hold employment, (c)
the cumulative effect of multiple injuries, (d) the occupation of the employee, (e) the employee's
age, and (f) any manifestation of the occupational disease. With respect to Mr. Marquez's circumstances, this first group of factors readily suggest that he would be entitled to permanent disability benefits. The Surety does not contend otherwise. This first group of factors does not include any reference to the lawfulness of employment.
The second group of factors under LC. § 72-430(1) when dete1111ining an employee's capacity for "gainful activity" under LC. § 72-425, include "the diminished ability of the afflicted
employee to compete in an open labor market within a reasonable geographical area considering
all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee." With respect to this second group
of factors, this Court has construed the tenn "open labor market within a reasonable geographic
area" as "the market in which the claimant was living at the time of hearing." Davaz, 125 Idaho
at 337,870 P.2d at 1296. See also Brown v. Home Depot, 152 Idaho 605,608,272 P.3d 577,580
(2012). Mr. Marquez lives in Emmett, Idaho. Under LC. § 72-430(1), consideration would be
given to Mr. Marquez's diminished ability to compete for employment in and around Emmett,
Idaho. Despite his status as an undocumented worker, it is undisputed that he actively competed
and obtained employment for nearly two decades in and around Emmett, Idaho. It is also undis-
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puted that Mr. Marquez's ability to compete in that same market has been diminished because of
his injury. The Surety does not contend otherwise. This supports an award of pennanent disability benefits to Mr. Marquez.
The Surety focuses upon the third group of factors to be considered under LC. § 72430(1) determining an employee's capacity for "gainful activity" under LC. § 72-425, which includes "all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee." This Court has construed
this third group of factors as including "age, sex, education, economic and social environment,
training and usable skills." Kindred v. Amalgamted Sugar Co., 114 Idaho 284, 291, 756 P.2d
401, 408 (1988). This Court has never construed this third group of factors as including consideration of an employee's immigration status or its effect upon the lawfulness of employment.
Nor would such consideration be appropriate given the language in LC. § 72-204(2) expressly
excluding consideration of the la-wfulness of employment. Any suggestion by the Surety that the
lav.,fulness of employment should be considered under LC. § 72-430(1) is contrary to the express
language of LC. § 72-204(2) and would in1properly make the "whether lawfully or unlawfully,
employed" language in LC. § 72-204(2) superfluous. See Golub v. Kirk-Scott, Ltd., 157 Idaho
966, 974, 342 P.3d 893, 901 (2015) ("Effect must be given to all the words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant.")
Again, there is no language in LC. § 72-430(1), or anywhere else in the IWCA, prohibiting consideration of both lawful and unlawful employment- there is only the language of LC. §
72-204(2) defining "employee" as any person employed in Idaho without regard to whether the
person is "lawfully or unlawfully employed." Given the express legislative mandate of LC. § 72-

18

204(2) and its application throughout the IWCA, the only reasonable interpretation is that the
lawfulness of employment is never considered under the IWCA and that all IWCA benefits, including permanent disability, are available to all Idaho workers whether lawfully or unlawfully
employed. Given the unambiguous language of the IWCA, the Idaho legislature's intent in this
respect is clear.
Had the Idaho legislature intended to exclude consideration ofunlmvful employment with
respect to permanent disability benefits, the legislature knows how to do so. Title 72 of the Idaho
Code provides a perfect example. Title 72 includes not only the IWCA but also the Idaho Employment Security Act ("IESA"), I.C. § 72-1301 et. seq. 53 The IESA provides certain unemployment benefits to certain unemployed workers. Under the IESA, the Idaho legislature expressly excluded unemployment benefits for undocumented workers. Idaho Code § 721366(19)(a) of the IESA provides: "Benefits shall not be payable on the basis of services performed by an alien unless the alien was lawfully admitted for permanent residence at the time
such services were perfonned or was permanently residing in the United States under color of
law at the time the services were perfonned." Had the Idaho legislature intended to exclude undocumented workers from coverage and benefits under the IWCA, the legislature would have
simply included an express exclusion similar to the one it included in the IESA. No such exclusion is found in the IWCA.

The Idaho Industrial Commission has jurisdiction over workers' compensation benefits under
the IWCA as well as the unemployment benefits under the IESA. Consequently, the Idaho Industrial Commission is familiar with the requirements of both Acts.
53
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The broadly inclusive language of the IWCA provides coverage and benefits, including
permanent disability benefits, to all injured Idaho employees without consideration of the lawfulness of employment. The IWCA contains no language excluding undocumented workers from
its coverage and benefits, including permanent disability benefits. Any .other interpretation of the
IWCA would contravene the well-established principle that "workers' compensation laws are
liberally construed in favor of the employee [whether lawfully or unlmvfully employed], in order
to serve the humane purpose behind the law." Estate of Aikele v. City of Blaclifoot, 160 Idaho
903, 908, 382 P.3d 352, 357 (2016). See also Davaz, 125 Idaho at 336-37, 870 P.2d at 1295-96;
LC. § 72-204(2).

II.

Legislative history supports interpreting the IWCA as providing coverage and
benefits to all Idaho employees without regard to immigration status.
A.

Legislative history surrounding the enactment of the IWCA reveals that
immigration status is irrelevant for purposes of permanent disability
benefits.

Because undocumented workers are a significant contributor to Idaho's economy, the
Idaho legislature has seen fit to provide coverage and benefits to undocumented workers. The
legislative policy for the enactment of the IWCA is set forth in I.C. § 72-201. As stated therein,
the principal upon which the entire IWCA rests is that "[t]he welfare of the state depends upon
its industries and even more upon the welfare of its wageworkers." I.C. § 72-201 (Emphasis added). It cannot be disputed that undocumented workers are "wageworkers" in the State of Idaho
and that the "welfare" of undocumented workers is therefore paramount under the IWCA.
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In 2012, it was estimated that there were approximately 8.1 million undocumented workers in the United States comprising approximately 5.1 % of the nation's labor force. See Roos
Foods v. Guardado, 152 A.3d 114, 120 n.31 (Del. 2016) (citing Jeffrey S. Passel & D'Vera

Cohn, Pew Research Ctr. 's Hispanic Trends Project, Unauthorized Immigrant Total Rise in 7
States, Fall in 14: Decline in Those From Mexico Fuels Most State Decreases, 29 tbl. A3

(2014)(hereinafter "Pew Research")). 54 This same Pew Research indicated that Idaho's undocumented worker population was one of the fastest growing in the nation and that, in 2012, there
were approximately 35,000 undocumented workers in Idaho comprising approximately 4.6% of
Idaho's labor market. See Pew Research at Table A3. It cannot be disputed that undocumented
workers represent a significant portion of Idaho's total labor force. The Idaho Industrial Commission has found that "illegal aliens comprise a significant fraction of the agricultural workforce."55 The Surety has not challenged this factual finding by the Commission. As a significant
portion of Idaho's labor market, undocumented workers play an equally significant role in the
overall economy of the State ofidaho.
Because of the impact upon the State's economy, it was sound public policy as stated in
I.C. § 72-201 for the Idaho legislature to enact the IWCA with broadly inclusive language protecting the "welfare" of undocumented workers. Not only does I. C. § 72-201 express the legislative intent that the IWCA should be construed in a manner protecting the "welfare" of all workers, including undocumented workers, it also expresses the legislative intent that the IWCA

54
55

http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2014/11/2014-11-18 unauthorized-immig:ration.pdf.
R. at p. 31 (Idaho Industrial Commission Order).
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should be construed in a manner providing "sure and certain relief' for those workers and their
families. LC. § 72-201.
In this respect, it is important to remember how the enactment of the IWCA protected the
welfare of all workers in the State. Prior to the enactment of the IWCA, the only legal recourse
available to injured employees in the State of Idaho was to sue their employers in t01i which required consideration of the negligence of both the employer and the employee. With the enactment of the IWCA, Idaho employees were provided injury benefits "regardless of questions of
fault" but "to the exclusion of every other remedy." LC. § 72-201. In other words, the coverage
and benefits of the IWCA came with a quid pro quo eliminating tort relief for injured employees.
See Venters v. Sorrento Del., Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 251, 108 P.3d 392,398 (2005) ("[T]his liabil-

ity for payment of workers' compensation benefits comes with a quid pro quo, in the form
of tort immunity."). As a quid pro quo exchange, it must be assumed that the Idaho legislature
intended for the IWCA to be construed in a manner providing benefits to injured Idaho workers
that are at least as valuable, albeit different, than those that had previously been available under
common law tort principles.
The tort remedies originally available to undocun1e11ted workers in Idaho were addressed
by this Court in the case of Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 733 P.2d 1234 (1986). In that case,
an undocumented agricultural worker brought a tort claim against his employer for the loss of his
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hand in a potato harvester. 56 The jury awarded $1,350,000 in damages. On appeal, the employer
argued that evidence of the worker's status as an illegal alien should not have been excluded at
trial. This Court rejected the employer's argument, because the effect that the worker's status as
an illegal alien might have on his future wage loss as a result of deportation or otherwise was
"merely speculative," particularly given that the worker had already been in the United States for
more than six years at the time of trial. Id. at p. 624, 733 P.2d at 1249. This Court commented
that "it is anomalous for [the _employer] to complain about [the undocumented worker] being
compensated on the basis of the wages he was receiving" after the employer "accepted the benefits of his labors as an illegal alien." Id.
The judicial directive in the Sanchez case was clear. With respect to a tort claim filed by
an injured undocumented worker against an employer, the injured worker was entitled to pursue
future lost wages without regard to the injured worker's immigration status. Consequently, this
Court held that it was appropriate calculate an undocumented worker's future wage loss based
upon the wage rate that the worker had been receiving in the United States. Id. at p. 624, 733
P.2d at 1249.
Although tort remedies were eliminated by the IWCA, the Idaho legislature nevertheless
drafted the IWCA to provide a benefit for probable future wage loss to injured workers in the
fom1 of IWCA permanent disability benefits. See LC. § 72-425 ( defining the evaluation of permanent disability as being an "appraisal of the injured employee's present and probable future

56

At the time of this case, agricultural workers were exempted from the IWCA. As discussed
below, the IWCA was amended in 1996 to include agricultural workers.
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ability to engage in gainful activity"). This was a critical component of the quid pro quo substitution of common law tort with IWCA benefits for Idaho employees.
Just as immigration status was irrelevant to a future wage loss claim under common law
tort, it is equally irrelevant to a permanent disability claim under the IWCA. It would be unreasonable to constrne the IWCA any other way, particularly given the legislative and judicial mandate that it be construed liberally to ensure sure and certain relief to all Idaho workers, including
undocumented workers. See I.C. 72-201 ("The welfare of the state depends ... upon the welfare of
its wageworkers ... sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their families and dependents
is hereby provided."); Davaz, 125 Idaho at 336-37, 870 P.2d at 1295-96 ("[W]e must liberally
construe the provisions of the workers' compensation law in favor of the employee, in order to
serve the humane purpose for which the law was promulgated.").
B.

Legislative history surrounding the 1996 repeal of the agricultural exemption
from the IWCA further reveals that immigration status is irrelevant for
purposes of permanent disability benefits.

Prior to 1996, all agricultural employment in Idaho was exempted from the IWCA, allowing agricultural employees to sue their employers in tort for work-related injuries. See pre1996 version of LC. § 72-212 at 1994 Idaho Session Laws ch. 293 § 14, p. 916. 57 During the
1996 legislative session, the Idaho legislature repealed this agricultural exemption. In so doing,
the Idaho legislature held several hearings in January and February 1996, where the legislative

Subsection (8) of the pre-1996 version of LC. § 72-212 provided: "None of the provisions of
this law [IWCA] shall apply to the following employments ... Agricultural pursuits ... [which]
shall include the raising or harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural commodity ... [and] shall
include the loading and transporting ... of any agricultural or horticultural commodity .... "
57
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committees heard from many groups with a special interest in undocumented workers, including
the Migrant Farm Workers Law Unit of Idaho Legal Aid Services, the Idaho Migrant Counsel,
the Idaho Farm Workers Association, the Dairymen's Association, the Idaho Hispanic Caucus,
and the Mujeres Unidas de Idaho. From these hearings, it is clear that the Idaho legislature was
fully aware that the repeal of the agricultural exemption would provide IWCA benefits to undocumented agricultural workers. With this awareness, had it been the Idaho legislature's intention
to exclude undocumented agricultural from IWCA, the Idaho legislature.would have simply included an exemption for undocumented workers in its 1996 amendment of LC. § 72-712. The
fact that the Idaho legislature did not include an exemption for undocumented workers in its
1996 amendment, knowing full well that the 1996 amendment would result in IWCA benefits
being provided to undocumented workers, is a clear expression of the legislature's intention that
undocumented workers receive all benefits provided by the IWCA, including permanent disability benefits.

III.

The IWCA's coverage of undocumented workers is not preempted by the federal
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
On appeal, the Surety is arguing that an award of permanent disability benefits under the

IWCA is preempted by the federal Immigration Refonn and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"),
which IRCA makes it unlawful for employers to knowingly hire undocumented workers and for
employees to use fraudulent documents to establish employment eligibility. 8 U.S.C.S. §§ 1324a
& 1324c. In support of its argument, the Surety relies upon Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.

NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (hereinafter "Hoffman"), in which the United States Supreme Court
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held that an undocumented worker was not entitled to "backpay" under the National Labor Relations Act as an optional remedy for his unlawful termination. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149-150.
The Idaho Supreme Court has not yet considered whether the IRCA preempts the IWCA
with respect to undocumented workers in Idaho. However, many jurisdictions that have directly
considered this issue have uniformly held that the IRCA does not preempt disability benefits
provided to undocumented workers under state workers' compensation laws notwithstanding the

Hoffman decision. See Delaware Valley Field Services. v. Ramirez, l 05 A.3d 396 (Del. Super.
Ct. 2012); Abel Verdon Const,·. v. Rivera, 348 S.W.3d 749 (Ky. 2011); Asylum Co. v. D.C. De-

partment of Employment Services, 10 A.3d 619 (D.C. 2010); Economy Packing Co. v. nlinois
Workers' Compensation Commission, 901 N.E.2d 915 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); Affordable Haus.
Found., Inc. v. Silva, 469 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006); Cont'! PET Techs. v. Palacias, 604 S.E.2d
627 (Ct. App. Ga. 2004); Dowling v. Slotnik, 712 A.2d 396 (Conn. 1998) ..
There are numerous reasons for holding that the IRCA does not preempt permanent disability benefits provided to undocumented workers under state workers' compensation laws.
First, the IRCA does not expressly preempt state laws providing disability benefits, including pennanent disability benefits, to injured workers. See Asylum Co., 10 A.3d at 631; Econ-

omy Packing, 901 N.E.2d at 921; Affordable Haus. Found., Inc, 469 F.3d at 239. Rather, the
IRCA contains an express preemption clause which provides that "[t]he provisions of this section
preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions ... upon those who employ, or
recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens." 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2). Workers'
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compensation benefits are not sanctions; they are designed to compensate an employee for workrelated injuries regardless of fault. Economy Packing, 90 l N .E.2d at 921.
Second, although the IRCA addresses the hiring of undocumented aliens, nothing in the
IRCA indicates that Congress sought to supersede state law providing workers' compensation
benefits to injured employees, whether undocumented or otherwise. Asylum Co., l O A.3d at 631;

Economy Packing, 901 N.E.2d at 922. To the contrary, the IRCA's legislative history suggests
that the statute was not intended "to undermine or diminish in any way labor protections in existing law." H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(1), at 58 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662.
Third, there is no conflict between the IRCA and providing permanent disability benefits
to undocumented workers for work-related injuries. Asylum Co., 10 A.3d at 631-33; Economy

Packing, 901 N.E.2d at 922. An award of permanent disability benefits for a work-related injury
is fundan1entally different than the backpay for an unlawful temunation as addressed in Hoffman.
Permanent disability benefits under LC. § 72-425 for diminished present and future ability to engage in gainful activity is a substitute remedy for common law tort, as opposed to backpay in

Hoffinan which simply addresses a statutory violation of federal law. Also, unlike the backpay in
Hoffman, permanent disability benefits are "not designed to make a worker whole for what he
would have earned if he had not continued working for his employer during the disability period," but rather are wage loss benefits "predicated upon the loss of wager-earning capacity" with
the purpose to compensate the injured worker for inability to earn a living at any job because of
the work-related injury. Asylum Co., 10 A.3d at 631-33. See also LC.§ 72-425 ("probable future
ability to engage in gainful activity"). And, unlike the undocumented alien in Hoffman, an in-
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jured undocumented worker suffers a loss of earning capacity umelated to her violation of the
IRCA. Economy Packing, 901 N.E.2d at 922.
Fourth, it is not illegal for an undocumented worker to seek or engage in unauthorized
employment under the IRCA. This was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) as follows:

The legislative background of IRCA underscores the fact that Congress
made a deliberate choice not to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek, or
engage in, unauthorized employment. A cmmnission established by Congress to
study immigration policy and to make recommendations concluded these penalties would be "unnecessary and unworkable." ... Proposals to make unauthorized
work a criminal offense were debated and discussed during the long process of
drafting IRCA. ... But Congress rejected them .... In the end, IRCA's framework
reflects a considered judgment that making criminals out of aliens engaged in unauthorized work- aliens who already face the possibility of employer exploitation
because of their removable status - would be inconsistent with federal policy and
objectives ....
. . .The correct instruction to draw from the text, structure, and history of IRCA is
that Congress decided it would be inappropriate to impose criminal penalties on
aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized employment. It follows that a state law
to the contrary is an obstacle to the regulatory system Congress chose ....
Id. at 405-06. Because it is not illegal for illegal aliens to seek or engage in unauthorized em-

ployment under the IRCA, an award of pennanent disability benefits to an undocumented worker
does not conflict with the IRCA or its purposes.
Fifth, providing permanent disability benefits to an undocumented worker does not contravene the primary purpose of the IRCA to reduce illegal entry into the United States. Economy
Packing, 901 N.E.2d at 923. The eligibility for workers' compensation benefits in the event of a
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work-related accident cannot "reasonably be described as an incentive for undocumented aliens
to unlawfully enter the United States." Economy Packing, 901 N.E.2d at 922. See also Abel Ver-

don Const!'., 348 S.W.3d at 755; Asylum Co., 10 A.3d at 633.
Sixth, refusing to provide workers' compensation benefits, including permanent disability, to undocumented workers would contravene the purpose of the IRCA "by providing a financial incentive for unscrupulous employers to hire unauthorized workers and engage in unsafe
practices, leaving the burden of caring for injured workers and their dependents to the residents
of the [state]." Abel Verdon Constr., 348 S.W.3d at 755. "[D]enying compensation coverage to
undocumented aliens creates powerful incentives for employers to hire such individuals." Asylum
Co., 10 A.3 d at 619 (citation omitted). "To refuse to allow recovery against a person responsible
for an illegal alien's employment who knew or should have known of the illegal alien's status
would provide an incentive for such persons to target illegal aliens for employment in the most
dangerous jobs or to provide illegal aliens with substandard working conditions." Affordable

Haus. Found., Inc. v. Silva, 469 F.3d at 248 (quoting Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868
A.2d 994, 1000 (N.H. 2005)).
Seventh, the Surety's reliance in this appeal on the case of Cherokee Indust,·ies, Inc. v.

Alvarez, 84 P.3d 798 (Okla. Civ. Ct. App. 2003) is misplaced. 58 The issue before the Corni is
whether Mr. Marquez is entitled to pursue pennanent disability under the IWCA. Cherokee In-

dustries does not address permanent disability and provides no authority with respect to the ap-

58

See Appellants' Brief at pp. 22-23.
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propriateness of permanent disability benefits. Cherokee Industries only addresses temporary
total disability benefits (TTD) and whether TTD benefits are precluded by the IRCA. The appropriateness of TTD is not presently before this Court given that the Surety has already paid TTD
benefits to :Mr. Marquez.
Eighth, the Surety's reliance in this appeal on the case of Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co.,
327 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2014) is also misplaced. 59 The Salas case was not a workers' compensation
case and therefore has no application to the issue before this Court. In Salas, an undocumented
worker sued his employer for unlawful termination and sought relief under the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act. The circumstances were uncannily similar to those in Hoffman.
Not surprisingly the California Supreme Court held that the undocumented worker's claim for
lost wages during the post-discovery period was preempted by the IRCA. Id. at 807. However,
the California Supreme Court held that the undocumented worker's claim for lost wages during
the pre-discovery period was not pre-empted by the IRCA. Id. at 807-08.
For these reasons which have been addressed in the above-referenced authority, the
IRCA does not preempt pennanent disability benefits provided to undocumented workers under
state workers' compensation laws. In other words, the IRCA does not preclude :Mr. Marquez
from seeking permanent disability benefits under the IWCA.

59

See Appellants' Brief at p. 23.
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IV.

The Surety's argument on appeal must be rejected because it is based upon the
fiction that undocumented workers are unable to engage in gainful activity in an
open labor market in Idaho.
The Surety's argument on appeal must be rejected, because the argument is dependent

upon the Surety's oft-repeated and fictitious contention that Mr. Marquez, as an undocumented
worker, does not have access to a labor market. As discussed above, there are approximately
35,000 illegal aliens working in Idaho. These 35,000 undocumented workers are clearly engaged
in gainful activities in Idaho. These undocumented workers represent a significant portion of
Idaho's total labor force and economy. This is the reality in Idaho. The IRCD consultant Mr.
Halcomb admitted as much when he testified at the hearing that there was a labor market for undocumented workers in the Treasure Valley. 60 Idaho Code § 72-425 requires that permanent disability be determined by appraising an injured employee's "present and probable future ability to
engage in gainful activity." This statute requires that an injured employee's ability to engage in
gainful activity be assessed based upon truthful facts and not based upon a fiction. Therefore, the
Suretf s fictitious contention that no labor market exists for undocumented workers must be rejected. Likewise, the Surety's argument that undocumented workers are not entitled to permanent
disability must also be rejected.
Lastly, the Surety's oft-repeated suggestion that the Idaho Industrial Commission's Order
"created" a system for providing permanent disability benefits to undocumented workers where
none had previously existed must also be rejected. It was not the Industrial Comm1ssion's Order

60

Tr. p. 36, 1. 36 top. 37, 1. 24.
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that "created" benefits for undocumented workers - it was the Idaho legislature who "created"
those benefits when it enacted the IWCA in 1917 for basically all Idaho workers and expanded
those benefits to agricultural workers in 1996. Just because the Industrial Commission did not
award permanent disability benefits to undocumented workers from 2009 through 2017 does not
mean that undocumented workers were not entitled to permanent disability benefits under the
IWCA during that time period. The Idaho Industrial Commission did not stop awarding pennanent disability benefits to undocumented workers until its decision in 2009 in Jesus Diaz v.

Franklin Building Supply, LC. 2006-507999 (Idaho Ind. Com. Nov. 20, 2009).
Note should be taken of this Court's decision in Serrano v. Four Seasons Framing, 157
Idaho 309,336 P.3d 242 (2014). In Serrano, this Corui affinned the denial of permanent disability benefits to an injured undocumented worker based exclusively upon a lack of causation evidence. Because the undocumented worker failed to satisfy his burden of proof, the Court did not
have an opportunity in Serrano to address the appropriateness of permanent disability benefits
for undocumented workers. Nevertheless, Justice Jones penned a concurrence in Serrano joined
by Justice Burdick that quoted the entirety of a dissent from the prior Industrial Commission's
decision of Diaz, which argued that undocumented workers should be entitled to pem1anent disability benefits under the IWCA. The Industrial Commission's Order at issue in the present case
tracks the analysis contained in the dissent in Diaz quoted in the concurrence in Serrano. Notably, the Industrial Commissioner that drafted the dissent in Diaz in 2009 is the same C01runissioner that drafted the majority opinion in the Idaho Industrial Commission's Order in 2017 that
is now before this Court on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is respectfully requested that the Idaho Supreme Court
hold that undocumented workers, like Mr. Marquez, are entitled to pursue permanent disability
benefits under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act without to immigration status.
DATED this 16th day of January 2018.
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